

JFK Assassination System  
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OPERATION MONGOOSE

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ID #

157 - 10011- 10008

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8 Dec 93  
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CARTER, MARSHALL

KAMCHATKA ✓  
[REDACTED]DATES:

9/20/62

CATEGORIES:

SPECIAL GROUP

OCCURRENCE: Special Group meeting on 20 September, the proposed use of [REDACTED] against KAMCHATKA was disapproved. The A-DCI raised the possibility of using this [REDACTED] against Cuba, but no decision was made, although the Group appeared favorably inclined.

SOURCE: Memorandum by Carter, 9/21/62 (02637)

STAFF: WALLACH

FILE:

DATE: 7/2/75

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
<u>CARD 3</u>		Card 3 of 3

OCCURRENCE: (continued from Memo for the Special Group re: Cuba Project, Jan. 24, 1962  
detectives and foreign police officials." (00106)

In regard to Task #7 of General Lansdale's review this memo notes, "Moreover, the development of a resistance movement will not remain controllable, so that operational time tables produced during the next four weeks can serve only as guides for a proposed sequence of actions." (00107)

The memorandum notes that six men to form the initial nucleus for work for inside Cuba have been assessed in depth. Fifteen locations have been selected as suitable centers for resistance. It was also noted that in support of State's efforts, CIA has conducted propaganda operations including a number of mass demonstrations in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,

Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

SOURCE:

FILE:

**TOP SECRET**

STAFF:

DATE:

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(U) (A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

PRES. KENNEDY, HARVEY, TAYLOR

Doc 20

DATES:

MAY 7, 1962

CATEGORIES:

MONGOOSE,  
SPECIAL GROUP  
AUGMENTED

OCCURRENCE:

Memo: "I reported to higher authority the substance of Mr. HARVEY'S briefing of the SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED on 3 MAY 1962, pointing out the very limited progress which has been made and the uncertainty of the ultimate effectiveness of our program. I mentioned the Doc 20 incident as indicative of the morale problem. It was agreed we would continue along the present lines until the terminal date of the present phase in August."

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE: MEMO FOR RECORD, REPORT OF PROGRESS TO HIGHER  
AUTHORITY: MAY 7, 1962, MAXWELL D. TAYLOR (00024)

FILE:

STAFF: DiGenova

DATE:

7/2/75

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*Q* 8 Dec 93  
(1)(B)  
(1)(C)

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
HELMS ✓ PRESIDENT KENNEDY MCCONE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD	July 25, 1962	SPECIAL GROUP MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: Helms notes that McCone briefed the panel of the President's foreign intelligence advisory board on political action projects. He pointed out that "each project must have his approval to the circulation to the members of the Special Group". For example, reconnaissance overflights are now approved. [redacted]

[redacted] Helms read to the panel a paper on the operation Mongoose which the Director had used earlier in the day for giving a briefing to the President."

SOURCE: Memorandum for the record, re meeting on CA matters with the panel of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board of Helms, dated July 25, 1962 (00870)

FILE:

STAFF:

diGenova

DATE:

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*J* 8 Dec 73

(1)(B)  
(1)(C)

JFK ✓ Maxwell Taylor	<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u> 27 Sept 62	<u>CATEGORIES:</u> Special Group Aug- MOONGOOSE <sup>mented</sup> Diem/
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OCCURRENCE:

Taylor states that the Special Group and the Special Group Augmented considered a proposal by CIA for covert activities designed to harass the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This had been prepared in response to a request by the Sec.'s of State and Defense. ✓

Taylor added that the Special Group asked that a more detailed operation plan be prepared. It was agreed that Defense make certain equipment and personnel available to CIA in support of this program. An elint flight designed to identify the North Vietnamese radar order of battle, so as to permit planning over flight routes was authorized. This will be flown out of Saigon, using the specially equipped aircraft available on Taiwan, but with the Chinese Air Force markings removed, and employing Chinese Nationalist pilots documented South Vietnamese citizens.

SOURCE: Maxwell Taylor's memorandum for the President, dated Sept 27, 1962. (000050)

FILE:

STAFF: PGW

DATE: 6/29/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

PRESIDENT KENNEDY ✓ BUNDY  
ROBERT KENNEDY  
HELMS  
RUSK  
MCNAMARA

DATES:

Nov. 12, 1963

CATEGORIES:

MONGOOSE  
PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL

OCCURRENCE:

On November 12, 1963 a meeting on "Cuban Operations" was held with "Higher Authority" (President Kennedy). Present were Mr. RUSK, Mr. MCNAMARA, Mr. ROBERT KENNEDY, Mr. BUNDY, Mr. MCCONE, Mr. JOHNSON, Mr. KILPATRICK, Mr. VANCE, Mr. HELMS, Mr. FITZGERALD, Mr. ~~CHENEY~~, Mr. STEAKLEY. Mr. MCCONE gave a brief summary of recent developments inside Cuba and Mr. Fitzgerald reported on Cuban operations under six main headings. (Mr. FITZGERALD's discussions of these headings is contained in separate cards.)

SOURCE:

Memorandum for the record dated Nov. 12, 1963  
FILE: "Cuban Operations"

STAFF:

DATE: Kelley

6/28/75

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(1)(A)



<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
PRESIDENT KENNEDY ROBERT KENNEDY ✓ HELMS RUSK	Nov. 12, 1963	MONGOOSE PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL

OCCURRENCE:  
On Nov. 12, 1963, Mr. Fitzgerald reported to the President that the United State economic denial program is contributing to Cuba's declining economy, but would be more effective [redacted]

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:

Memorandum for record dated Nov. 12, 1963

FILE: "Cuban Operations"

STAFF:

DATE: Kelley

6/28/75

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(1)(c)

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10 Dec 93  
(1)(2)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

McCone  
Coloy  
Kennedy, John F. ✓  
McNamarra  
Lodge  
Nhu  
Hillsman  
Tung  
Diem

DATES:

11 Sept 63

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam with the CIA participants being McCone and Colby the record by Colby reflects that McNamarra pointed out that Lodge has little contact with Diem and has not been out of Saigon. Mr. McCone commented that he believed that we should move cautiously, that we should talk seriously to Diem and that Lodge should be urged to visit the countryside to obtain a more realistic view of the effects of suspending aid. Mr. McCone also suggested that another approach be made to Nhu to seek his cooperation in a departure. The President asked whether we had carefully studied the detail effects of cuts in aid (as proposed in a paper prepared by Hillsman). It was evident that the effects had not been studied. The President asked DOD and CIA to analyze the Hillsman paper. He also asked that a telegram be sent to Lodge asking him to try to reduce the press leakage from Saigon and to establish some real contact with Diem. Any current plans for aid negotiation should be stalled, and the President should be well informed of any steps taken in this context. ~~Such as the instance involving CIA payment to Col Tung last week.~~

STAFF

FILE: IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 21-22

DATE: Dawson  
6/27/75

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(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

~~SMITH, DAVID~~ MCCONE  
HARKINS, GENERAL HELMS  
TRUEHARD, WILLIAM COLBY  
KENNEDY, ROBERT  
KENNEDY, JOHN F. ✓

DATES:

Oct. 29, 1963

CATEGORIES:

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam on October 29, 1963 with MCCONE, HELMS, AND COLBY in attendance. The following record by HELMS and COLBY shows that: It was suggested that in the Ambassador's absence, HARKINS, TRUEHART, and ~~DAVID SMITH~~ act as a committee to direct a coup operation. MCCONE countered with the view that ~~SMITH~~ should not be involved in such a policy-making function, although he would be in a position to provide technical advise to HARKINS and TRUEHART as well as carry out their instructions in the operations field. The President stated that if the forces in Saigon were not clearly in favor of the coup we should discourage its launching. The Attorney General felt the U.S. was risking too much based on flimsy evidence. The DCI stated his view that even a successful coup would create a period of interregnum, confusion which might only be solved by a second or third coup.

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 38

STAFF:

DATE: 6/27/75  
Dawson

FILE:

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8 Dec 93

(1)(B)  
(1)(C)

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
<del>SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED</del> <del>MONGOOSE, (TAYLOR, RFK) JOHNSON,</del> GILPATRICK, (MCCONE) CARTER, LEMNITZER, (LANSDALE) CLINE, PARROTT	July 12, 1962 July 20, 1962 April 9, 1963	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE (CARD ONE OF TWO)

OCCURRENCE:

Lansdale briefed the group on numbers of agents in Cuba. Air resupply proposal submitted by CIA "should be deferred pending broader review of the entire situation." Taylor noted if urgent need for air supply proposal could be made to the Special Group Augmented at any time. "Mr. McCone emphasized that no high-level penetrations of the Cuban government have yet been attained." "The Attorney General inquired about the status of popular support for Castro, and also the possibility of a revolt against him." Lansdale replied, "There is no rallying point for active opposition." The AG and Johnson emphasize need to obtain hard intelligence on subversive activities by Castro in the hemisphere. A complete review of MONGOOSE was set toward the end of July. Taylor emphasized need for summaries of results "and a statement of future alternatives open to the U.S. should be developed." Looking into proposal to subsidize Japanese purchases of Dominican sugars so that the Japanese could divert these purchases from Cuba. McCone said that his experts had informed him that from a legal point of view, CIA could use unvouchered funds to support an operation of this kind. He cautioned,

SOURCE: Memo for the record, Minutes of the Special Group (Augmented) meeting 12 July 1962 re: Operation MONGOOSE, (00031-00032)

FILE:

STAFF: (continued)

di Genova  
DATE: July 2, 1975

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*gc* 10 Dec 83  
(1)CA)

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
<del>Zohbey</del> Harvey Kennedy, Robert ✓ Bissell HALPERN	<del>Feb</del> 1961 October,	Castro
<u>OCCURRENCE:</u> <p>Halpern testified that in the fall of 1961 he attended a meeting with Bissell and <del>Mr. Chase Zohbey</del>. <del>Zohbey</del> was the Branch Chief (8). The meeting occurred in the middle of Oct. of 1961. Bissell stated at the meeting that he had recently "been chewed out in the cabinet room of the White House by both the President and the Attorney General for as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of Castro and the Castro regime. His orders to both <del>Mr. Chase Zohbey</del> and to me <sup>W. F. 2</sup> to plan an operation to accomplish that end." (8) Halpern testified that no limitations were put on the term "get rid of". Nothing was forbidden (8). The meeting involved only general discussions and not tactics.</p>		
<u>SOURCE:</u> Halpern 6/18/75	<u>STAFF:</u> Shea <u>DATE:</u> 7/1/75	
<u>FILE:</u>		

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(1)(B)

<p><u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u></p> <p>BUNDY, GENERAL DECKER, MR. MURROW RFA, GENERAL LANSDALE, MARTIN GENERAL HARRIS, WILLIAM BUND, GENERAL CARTER</p>	<p><u>DATES:</u></p> <p>9/6/62</p>	<p><u>CATEGORIES:</u></p> <p>Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE</p>
<p><u>OCCURRENCE:</u></p> <p>Meeting of SGA On Operation MONGOOSE, 6 September 1962. Discussion of LANSDALE's suggestion #32 (agricultural sabotage). GENERAL CARTER emphasized the extreme sensitivity of any such operation and the disastrous results that would flow from something going wrong particularly if there were obvious attribution to the U.S. He went on to say, however, that it would be possible to accomplish this purpose by methods more subtle than those indicated in the paper. He mentioned specifically the possibility of producing crop failures by the introduction of biological agents which would appear to be of natural origin. BUNDY said that he had no worries about any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear as a result of local Cuban disaffection or a natural disaster, but that we must avoid external activities such as release of chemicals, etc. unless they could</p> <p><u>SOURCE:</u> be completely covered up.</p> <p><u>STAFF:</u></p>		
<p>SGA MONGOOSE Minutes 9/6/62 (00045-00046)</p> <p>PGW</p> <p>DATE: June 29, 1962</p> <p>FILE: Cage</p>		

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18 Dec 93

(1) (A)

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PERSONS/ENTITIES:

WALT ELDER, RFK, GENERAL LANSDALE,  
MCGEORGE BUNDY, ~~BRUCE CHEEVER~~ (CIA)

DATES:

9/14/62

CATEGORIES:

MONGOOSE  
Special Group Augmented

OCCURRENCE:

CIA Headquarters and all WH stations are to be especially to alert for any shipments of arms or other subversive material from Cuba to other Latin American countries-- Chief, Task Force W says this alert has been laid on and is in force.

SOURCE:

Memorandum for the record on MONGOOSE meeting, 14 Sept 1962-  
Walt Elder

FILE:

Cage

00049

STAFF:

PGW

DATE: June 30, 1975

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9/14/62 10 Doc

(1) (A)  
(1) (B)  
(1) (C)

<p><u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> Walt ELDER, RFK, GENERAL LANSDALE, MCGEORGE BUNDY, <b>BRUCE CHEEVER</b> (CIA),</p>	<p><u>DATES:</u> 9/14/62</p>	<p><u>CATEGORIES:</u> MONGOOSE Special Group Augmented</p>
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OCCURRENCE:  
Possibility of sabotage of [REDACTED] spare parts allegedly ready for shipment to Cuba  
by Canada is being looked into--Chief, Task Force W says this activity is underway.

**TOP SECRET**

<p><u>SOURCE:</u> Memorandum for the record on MONGOOSE meeting, 14 Sept 1962- Walt Elder <u>FILE:</u> Cage 00049</p>	<p><u>STAFF:</u> PGW <u>DATE:</u> June 30, 1975</p>
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(1) (A)

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
WALT ELDER ✓ GENERAL LANSDALE MCGEORGE BUNDY <del>BRUCE CLEVER</del> (CIA)	9/14/62	MONGOOSE Special Group Augmented
<u>OCCURRENCE:</u>		

The 12 September addendum to the Phase II MONGOOSE operations was discussed and the entire Phase II was approved in principle as a platform from which to proceed. ✓  
Activities which may be especially sensitive are to be brought before the group, and this body wishes to be kept generally advised on progress.

**TOP SECRET**

<u>SOURCE:</u> Memorandum for the record on MONGOOSE meeting, 14 Sept 1962- Walt Elder <i>(copy)</i>	<u>STAFF:</u> PGW
<u>FILE:</u> Cage	<u>DATE:</u> June 30, 1975

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10 Dec 73  
(1) (A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

WALT ELDER, RFK, GENERAL LANSDALE  
MCGEORGE BUNDY, ~~BRUCE CHEEVER~~ (CIA)

DATES:

9/14/62

CATEGORIES:

MONGOOSE  
Special Group Augmented

OCCURRENCE:

This memorandum reports that the ATTORNEY GENERAL "expressed concern that activities by certain Cuban exiles are reaching the point where the government may be forced to take action against them rather than to simply state that "we are investigating." The agency is requested to see what it can do to help the noise level of these activities. ✓

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:

Memorandum for the record on MONGOOSE meeting. 14 Sept 1962  
Walt Elder (00818)

FILE: Cage

STAFF: PCW

DATE: June 30, 1975

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10 DEC 93

(1)(CA)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

~~NESTOR SANCHEZ~~

Robert F. KENNEDY ✓  
AMLASH-1

DATES:

Oct. 11, 1963

CATEGORIES:

Castro

OCCURRENCE:

~~NESTOR SANCHEZ~~ (a Spanish-speaking case officer from Headquarters, acting as case officer for AMLASH-1) cabled that AMLASH-1 "was insistent upon meeting with a senior U.S. official, preferably Robert F. KENNEDY, for assurances of U.S. moral support" (88) for AMLASH's activities in Guba. ~~SANCHEZ~~ recommended that "Highest and profound consideration be given" (88) because AMLASH-1 was determined to attempt an operation against Castro "with or without U.S. support" (88).

SOURCE:

IG REPORT 1967

STAFF:

F Baron

DATE:

7/1/75

FILE:

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10 Dec 23

(1) (A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Desmond FITZGERALD

AMLASH

~~Nestor SANCHEZ~~

Robert KENNEDY ✓

HELMS

DATES:

Oct. 29, 1963

Nov. 13, 1963

Castro

CATEGORIES:

Card 1 of 2

OCCURRENCE: (CARD 1)

Desmond FITZGERALD, Chief of SAS, met with AMLASH, using ~~Nestor SANCHEZ~~ as interpreter. (88-89). The cover of the "contact plan for the meeting, a copy of which is in the AMLASH file," (89) read as follows:

"FITZGERALD will represent self as personal representative of Robert F. KENNEDY, who traveled Paris for specific purpose meeting (AMLASH) and giving him assurances of full U.S. support if there is change of the present government in Cuba." (89)

According to FITZGERALD, he discussed the planned meeting with the DD/P (HELMS) who decided it was not necessary to seek approval from Robert KENNEDY for FITZGERALD to speak in his name." (89) (emphasis added)

SOURCE:

STAFF:

F Baron

IG REPORT 1967

DATE:

7/1/75

FILE:

**TOP SECRET**

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> <del>SANCHEZ</del> FITZGERALD AMLASH	<u>DATES:</u> Oct. 29, 1963 Nov. 13, 1963	<u>CATEGORIES:</u> Castro Card 2 of 2
<u>OCCURRENCE:</u> (CARD 2) In a memorandum by <del>SANCHEZ</del> on November 13, 1963, it was reported that "FITZGERALD informed [AMLASH] that the U.S. is prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti-Communist Cuban group which succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban leadership." (89) Despite the fact <del>that SANCHEZ reported</del> that "nothing of an operational nature was discussed at the FITZGERALD meeting" (90), FITZGERALD recalled that AMLASH-1 "spoke repeatedly of the need for an assassination weapon. In particular, he wanted a high-powered rifle with telescopic sights or some other weapon that could be used to kill Castro from a distance." (90) FITZGERALD said that he told AMLASH "that the U.S. Government would have no part of an attempt on CASTRO's life. (90) However, the <del>SANCHEZ</del> memorandum reported "After the meeting [AMLASH] stated that he was satisfied with the policy discussion but now <del>stands to know</del> what technical support we could provide him." (90)		
<u>SOURCE:</u> IG REPORT 1967	<u>STAFF:</u> F. Baron	<u>DATE:</u> 7/1/75

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10 Dec 73

(1) CA)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

~~SMITH, DAVID~~ MCCONE  
HARKINS, GENERAL HELMS  
TRUEHARD, WILLIAM COLBY  
KENNEDY, ROBERT ✓  
KENNEDY, JOHN F.

DATES:

Oct. 29, 1963

CATEGORIES:

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam on October 29, 1963 with MCCONE, HELMS, AND COLBY in attendance. The following record by HELMS and COLBY shows that: it was suggested that in the Ambassador's absence, HARKINS, TRUEHART, and ~~DAVID SMITH~~ act as a committee to direct a coup operation. MCCONE countered with the view that ~~SMITH~~ should not be involved in such a policy making function, although he would be in a position to provide technical advise to HARKINS and TRUEHART as well as carry out their instructions in the operations field. The President stated that if the forces in Saigon were not clearly in favor of the coup we should discourage its launching. The Attorney General felt the U.S. was risking too much based on filmsy evidence. The DCI stated his view that even a successful coup would create a period of interregnum, confusion which might only be solved by a second or third coup.

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 38

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE: Dawson  
6/27/75

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(U) (A)

<p><u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT KENNEDY ✓ HELMS <del>CHIEF</del> STEAKLEY</p>	<p><u>DATES:</u> Nov. 5, 1963</p>	<p><u>CATEGORIES:</u> CASTRO MONGOOSE SPECIAL GROUP</p>
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OCCURRENCE:

Note that the minutes of the Special Group meeting on November 5, 1963 contain an underscored item on page 1 stating "see special minutes for additional items." This item appears on page 1 under a discussion of Cuban sabotage and infiltration operations.

**TOP SECRET**

<p><u>SOURCE:</u> Minutes of Special Group meeting dated Nov. 6, 1963.</p>	<p><u>STAFF:</u> Kelley</p>
<p><u>FILE:</u></p>	<p><u>DATE:</u> 6/28/75</p>

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10 Dec 93  
(1)(3)

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
PRESIDENT KENNEDY ✓ ROBERT KENNEDY HELMS RUSK BUNDY MCNAMARA	Nov. 12, 1963	MONGOOSE PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL
<u>OCCURRENCE:</u> On Nov. 12, 1963, Mr. Fitzgerald reported to the President that the United State economic denial program is contributing to Cuba's declining economy, but would be more effective		

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:

Memorandum for record dated Nov. 12, 1963

FILE: "Cuban Operations"

STAFF:

DATE: Kelley

6/28/75



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10 Dec 23  
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

PRESIDENT KENNEDY BUNDY  
ROBERT KENNEDY  
HELMS  
RUSK  
MCNAMARA

DATES:

Nov. 12, 1963

CATEGORIES:

MONGOOSE  
PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL

OCCURRENCE:

On November 12, 1963 a meeting on "Cuban Operations" was held with "Higher Authority" (President Kennedy). Present were Mr. RUSK, Mr. MCNAMARA, Mr. ROBERT KENNEDY, Mr. BUNDY, Mr. MCCONE, Mr. JOHNSON, Mr. KILPAGRICK, Mr. VANCE, Mr. HELMS, Mr. FITZGERALD, Mr. SCHEIDT, Mr. STEAKLEY. Mr. MCCONE gave a brief summary of recent developments inside Cuba and Mr. Fitzgerald reported on Cuban operations under six main headings. (Mr. FITZGERALD's discussions of these headings is contained in separate cards.)

SOURCE:

Memorandum for the record dated Nov. 12, 1963  
FILE: "Cuban Operations"

STAFF:

DATE: Kelley

6/28/75

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13 Dec 93  
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Desmond FITZGERALD

AMLASH

~~Nestor SANCHEZ~~

Robert KENNEDY ✓

HELMS

DATES:

Oct. 29, 1963

Nov. 13, 1963

Castro

CATEGORIES:

Card 1 of 2

**TOP SECRET**

OCCURRENCE: (CARD 1)

Desmond FITZGERALD, Chief of SAS, met with AMLASH, using ~~Nestor SANCHEZ~~ as interpreter. (88-89). The cover of the "contact plan for the meeting, a copy of which is in the AMLASH file," (89) read as follows:

"FITZGERALD will represent self as personal representative of Robert F. KENNEDY who traveled Paris for specific purpose meeting (AMLASH) and giving him assurances of full U.S. support if there is change of the present government in Cuba." (89)

According to FITZGERALD, he discussed the planned meeting with the DD/P (HELMS) who decided it was not necessary to seek approval from Robert KENNEDY for FITZGERALD to speak in his name." (89) (emphasis added)

SOURCE:

STAFF:

F Baron

DATE:

7/1/75

IG REPORT 1967

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
<del>SANCHEZ</del> FITZGERALD AMLASH	Oct. 29, 1963 Nov. 13, 1963	Castro  <i>Card 2 of 2</i>

OCCURRENCE:

(CARD 2)

In a memorandum by ~~SANCHEZ~~ on November 13, 1963, it was reported that "FITZGERALD informed [AMLASH] that the U.S. is prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti-Communist Cuban group which succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban leadership." (89) Despite the fact that ~~SANCHEZ~~ reported that "nothing of an operational nature was discussed at the FITZGERALD meeting" (90), FITZGERALD recalled that AMLASH-1 "spoke repeatedly of the need for an assassination weapon. In particular, he wanted a high-powered rifle with telescopic sights or some other weapon that could be used to kill Castro from a distance." (90) FITZGERALD said that he told AMLASH "that the U.S. Government would have no part of an attempt on CASTRO's life. (90) However, the ~~SANCHEZ~~ memorandum reported "After the meeting [AMLASH] stated that he was satisfied with the policy discussion but now ~~SANCHEZ~~ would like to know what technical support we could provide him." (90)

SOURCE:

IG REPORT 1967

STAFF:

F. Baron

FILE:DATE:

7/1/75

TOP SECRET

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13 Dec 73  
(1) (A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCONE  
HELMS  
BUNDY  
✓ R. KENNEDY

DATES:

Mar 2, 1964

CATEGORIES:

Special Group  
Mongoose

OCCURRENCE: Helms states that agency officers have reported plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate selected Cuban government leaders. Agency officers told Cubans that U.S. would not condone the planned actions. Plans included: Cuban exile approach to March 2, 1964 by businessman to discuss a plan which was "still in the embryonic state to assassinate Fidel Castro." Businessman has underworld connections with Cosa Nostra. Latter group has offered to assassinate Castro for \$150,000. Proposes to use 5 men. March 3, 1964 meeting in which Byron Cameron says he met an unidentified group which would be willing to assassinate selected Cuban officials for cash. Specifically the Cameron group is interested in assassinating Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Ernesto Che Guevara. "Cameron" knows that he can indicted for conspiracy.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Memorandum for DCI McCone from Richard Helms re plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate selected Cuban government leaders, June 10, 1964 (03105-031110)  
FILE:

STAFF:

diGenova

DATE:

7/3/75

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13 Dec 93

(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

McCONE FITZGERALD  
BUNDY OPAPICH  
JESSUP RFK ✓  
STEAKLEY JMWAVE  
JMWAVE VANCE

HUGHES

BOSCH, JOSE

DATES:

8/19/64

7/30/64

6/10/64

CATEGORIES:

SCA

MONGOOSE

CASTRO

**TOP SECRET**

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64, "It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICH of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116) "The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director," (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affrs.; ASst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs, Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report "related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was \$150,000. - ~~JOSE MARIO PEPTIN~~ BOSCH, Preso of Bacardi Rum, would contribute \$50,000. BOSCH approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence." SOURCE: Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from ~~McCauley~~ Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intwvs with the alleged participants. "Obviously nothing came of the plot." (117)

FILE:

IG REPORT 1967

Baron, 7/1/75

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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT.  
AS SANITIZED -13 Doc 93

SC (1) (A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCONE FITZGERALD  
BUNDY PAPICH  
JESSUP RFK  
STEAKLEY JMWAVE  
JMWAVE VANCE

HUGHES

~~BOSCH, JOSE~~

DATES:

8/19/64  
7/30/64  
6/10/64

CATEGORIES:

SCA  
NONGOOSE  
CASTRO

**TOP SECRET**

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64, "It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICH of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116)" The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director, (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affrs.; ASst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs, Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was \$150,000. ~~JOSE MARIA PERIN~~ BOSCH, Preso of Bacardi Rum would contribute \$50,000. BOSCH approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence." SOURCE: Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from McClellan to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intvws with the alleged participants. "Obviously nothing came of the plot." (117)

IG REPORT 1967

Baron, 7/1/75

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(1) (CA)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCCONE  
BUNDY  
JESSUP  
STEAKLEY  
JMWAVE

HUGHES

~~BOSCH, JOSE~~

SGA  
MONGOOSE  
CASTRO

DATES:

8/19/64  
7/30/64  
6/10/64

CATEGORIES:

**TOP SECRET**

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64, "It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICH of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116) "The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director," (115) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affairs.; Asst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs, Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was \$150,000. - ~~JOSE MARIO PEPIN~~ ~~BOSCH~~, Preso of Bacardi Rum would contribute \$50,000. ~~BOSCH~~ approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence." SOURCE Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from ~~SECRET~~ to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intwvs with the alleged participants. "Obviously nothing came of the plot." (117)

IG REPORT 1967

Baron, 7/1/75

FILE:

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PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MURPHY  
KILPATRICK ✓  
~~AGCENT~~  
FITZGERALD

LYMAN

~~CASTRO~~  
**CASTRO'S  
SISTER**

DATES:

4/23/63

CATEGORIES:

CUBA

SPECIAL GROUP

OCCURRENCE:

Murphy asked Fitzgerald whether Castro's immediate entourage had been penetrated. Fitzgerald replied that ~~Castro's sister~~ worked for us, but ~~that she~~ didn't always have inside information.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Memorandum, dated 4/23/63, prepared by Lyman and Kilpatrick.

FILE:

STAFF:

WALLACE

DATE:

7/2/75



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J 13 Dec 93  
(1)(b)

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
JOHNSON KILPATRICK ✓ MCCONE	Sept. 16, 1963	MONGOOSE SPECIAL GROUP

OCCURRENCE:

On September 16, 1963 a memorandum reported that "all members of the special group have approved project ~~COARAGE~~ (having to do with certain ~~ELINT~~ activities in the area of Cuba.)"

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Memorandum dated 16 September 1963 for members of the Special Group from Mr. Parrott

FILE:

STAFF:

Kelley

DATE:

6/28/75

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13 Dec 23

(1) (A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Edwards King ✓ Bannerman Gomez <del>Holcombe</del> O'Connell	11/62	Castro
<p><u>OCCURRENCE:</u> O'Connell testified that when EDWARDS was on leave, once, KING spoke to Robert BANNERMAN (Who was not witting of Castro project) and O'Connell had to tell BANNERMAN that B. was not "privy" to project. O'Connell was embarrassed. (Tr. 36, 99-100). No one but KING, not Gomez or <del>Holcombe</del>, knew (100).</p>		

<p><u>SOURCE:</u> Testimony of James P. O'Connell, 5/30/75</p>	<p><u>STAFF:</u> John Bayly</p>
<p><u>FILE:</u></p>	<p><u>DATE:</u> 6/30/75</p>

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13 Dec 93  
(1) (A)

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

KING, J. C. ✓ HARVEY  
IG REPORT EDWARDS  
BISSELL  
HALPERN

DATES:

May 23, 1967

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO

OCCURRENCE:

The following sources of information were used in preparing the IG REPORT of 1967: (1) Files: Furnished for review by the Director of Security, the Deputy Director for Support, the General Counsel, the Legislative Counsel, the Chief of WH Division, and by Col. J. C. KING, former Chief of WH Division. Also, the Director of Central Reference furnished biographic files and intelligence publications. (2) Interviews: Desmond Fitzgerald, Sam Halpern, ~~Bruce Cheever~~, J. C. King, Alfonso Rodriguez, J. D. Esterline, Edward Gunn, Howard Osborn, James O'Connell, Sidney Gottlieb, Sheffield Edwards, Richard Bissell, Lawrence Houston, ~~Ray Treichler~~, John Warner, ~~Nestor Sanchez~~, William Harvey, Cornelius Roosevelt, Robert Bannerman, ~~Henry Bortner~~, Richard Ober.

SOURCE: IG REPORT, 1967

FILE:

STAFF: Baron


DATE: 7/2/75

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19 Dec 63


(1)(A)  
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES: <u>KIRKPATRICK</u> William Harvey Gen. Lansdale Walter Elder DCI	DDP Mr. Halpern 	DATES: <u>11/14/62</u> Nov. 21, 1962 <u>10/30/63</u>	CATEGORIES: Special Group Augmented Operation Mongoose Cuba  OCCURRENCE: With regard to paragraph 2 of Lansdale's memorandum to SGA dated 14 Nov. 1962 Harvey states: "The statement that Operation Mongoose had had no information on this operation since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the pen ultimate paragraph and Lansdale's memorandum concerning a report for the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to a telephonic conversation on the evening of 30 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and <u>Chieever</u> which is referred specifically in paragraph 2 on pages 7 and 8 of my reference memorandum. I have discussed this matter in detail with <u>Chieever</u> and clearly recalls that his conversation with Lansdale on that date took place as reflected in my reference memorandum. During this conversation there was no discussion of previous operations except a brief discussion of the COMRA <u>and AMERID</u> teams and Lansdale did not ask, according to <u>Chieever's</u> recollection, any specific questions concerning assets inside or prior operations which SOURCE: would logically have led to the discussions at the time STAFF: of the Matahambre operation." Paul Wallach DATE: July 1, 1975
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Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962 (01151)  
FILE:

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13 Dec 93  
(1)(A)  
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
<u>KIRKPATRICK</u> DUP Mr. Halpern  Walter Elder DCI	11 114 163 Nov. 21, 1962 10 130 163	Special Group Augmented Operation Mongoose Cuba

OCCURRENCE: With regard to paragraph 2 of Lansdale's memorandum to SGA dated 14 Nov. 1962 Harvey states: "The statement that Operation Mongoose had had no information on this operation since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the pen ultimate paragraph and Lansdale's memorandum concerning a report for the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to a telephonic conversation on the evening of 30 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and Cheever which is referred specifically in paragraph 2 on pages 7 and 8 of my reference memorandum. I have discussed this matter in detail with Cheever and clearly recalls that his conversation with Lansdale on that date took place as reflected in my reference memorandum. During this conversation there was no discussion of previous operations except a brief discussion of the COBRA and unfired teams and Lansdale did not ask, according to Cheever, recollection, any specific questions concerning assets inside or prior operations which

SOURCE: would logically have led to the discussions at the time STAFF:

Paul Wallach

Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962 (01151)  
FILE:  
 DATE: July 1, 1975

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13 Dec 93

(1)(A)  
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
KIRKPATRICK	11/14/62	
William Harvey	Nov. 21, 1962	Special Group Augmented
Gen. Lansdale		Operation Mongoose
Walter Elder		Cuba
DCI	10/30/62	

OCCURRENCE:

With regard to paragraph 2 of Lansdale's memorandum to SGA dated 14 Nov. 1962 Harvey states: "The statement that Operation Mongoose had had no information on this operation since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the pen ultimate paragraph and Lansdale's memorandum concerning a report for the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to a telephonic conversation on the evening of 30 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and Cheever which is referred specifically in paragraph 2 on pages 7 and 8 of my reference memorandum. I have discussed this matter in detail with Cheever and clearly recalls that his conversation with Lansdale on that date took place as reflected in my reference memorandum. During this conversation there was no discussion of previous operations except a brief discussion of the CORRA (and WICKED) teams and Lansdale did not ask, according to Cheever's recollection, any specific questions concerning assets inside or prior operations which SOURCE: would logically have led to the discussions at the time STAFF: of the Matahambre operation."

Paul Wallach

Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962 (01151)

FILE:

DATE:

July 1, 1975

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*J* 13 Dec 73  
(1)(c)

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> LANSDALE,	<u>DATES:</u> Mar 2, 1962 Nov 30, 1961	<u>CATEGORIES:</u> Special Group <i>mongoose</i>
<p><u>OCCURRENCE:</u> Lansdale traces the history of the project from its inception on Nov. 30, 1961 through March 1, 1962. Under the latter date, he notes, "The Chief of Operations /Lansdale/is to report to the President through the Special Group (NSC 5412 Augmented by the Attorney General and the Chairman, JCS); the Special Group will be responsible for providing policy guidance for approving important operations, and for monitoring progress." (00181) Lansdale also submitted an intelligence plan for basic intelligence collection upon which to base the decision to undertake actions to cause the overthrow of Castro. The plan itself at pages 00183 through 00187, included establishing intelligence agents inside Cuba; collecting intelligence from Cubans inside the United States; counterfeiting ration cards and currency inside of Cuba; geographical surveys of air fields, military installations, communications centers; attempts to place trained agents inside the government organizations or to defect officials "in place"; and negotiating for British help in contaminating lubricants and fuels to cripple Cuban transportation. The British want to know how serious are you, before risking their assets to help the U.S." (00180-00187)</p>		
<u>SOURCE:</u> Program review by Brig. Gen. Lansdale, Mar 2, 1962 on the Cuba Project (00180-00187)	<u>STAFF:</u> di Genova	
<u>FILE:</u>	<u>DATE:</u> June 30, 1975	

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

(continuation)

DATES:CATEGORIES:

Card 2 of 4

OCCURRENCE: CARD 2

meeting of foreign ministers which opened January 22, 1962. The object was to get wide Western Hemisphere support for OAS resolutions condemning Cuba and isolating it from the rest of the hemisphere. "The OAS meeting is to be supported by public demonstrations in Latin America, generated by CIA and a psychological campaign assisted by USIA." The major task of the diplomatic capability was to encourage Latin American leaders to develop independent operations similar to the instant project seeking an internal revolt of the Cuban people against the Communist regime. In the economic warfare area an embargo on Cuban trade was to be considered after the OAS meeting. The CIA was unable to undertake the action to sabotage the sugar harvest which commences about January 15 and upon which Cuba's one-crop economy depended. Sabotage of transport, mills, sugar sacking in cane fields was explored, according to Lansdale's review. Special sabotage support was noted. →

SOURCE:FILE:STAFF:DATE:**TOD SECRET**



<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>  (continuation)	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>  <i>Card 3 of 4</i>
<u>OCCURRENCE: CARD 3</u> <p>"CIA has initiated action to contaminate POL supplies for Cuba, although visible results (stopage of some Cuban transports) is not expected until mid-1962. <del>CIA is introducing "lubzol," a corrosive additive to Cuban locomotive diesel fuel oil through commercial suppliers in Belgium.</del> A similar project was noted for jet fuel storage tanks in Cuba. Lansdale noted that the CIA had concluded that its realistic role should be to at least create the illusion of a popular movement, to win external support for it, to improve CIA operational capability, and to help create a climate which will permit provocative actions in support of a shift to overaction. Lansdale wanted them to reevaluate to see whether or not they could make a greater effort. An outline of what the 33 tasks are for each of the entities involved then follows in Lansdale's memo. The memorandum notes that the President directed that the Chief of Operations conduct the project through the appropriate organizations and departments of the government. In this regard the memo notes "Also, CIA apparently believes that its role should be to create and expand a popular</p>		
<u>SOURCE:</u>  <u>FILE:</u>	<u>STAFF:</u>  <u>DATE:</u>	

**TOP SECRET**

PERSONS/ENTITIES:CARD 3DATES:CATEGORIES:

Card 3 of 3

OCCURRENCE: (continued from Memo for the Special Group re: Cuba Project, Jan. 24, 1962  
 detectives and foreign police officials." (00106)

In regard to Task #7 of General Lansdale's review this memo notes, "Moreover, the development of a resistance movement will not remain controllable, so that operational time tables produced during the next four weeks can serve only as guides for a proposed sequence of actions." (00107)

The memorandum notes that six men to form the initial nucleus for work for inside Cuba have been assessed in depth. Fifteen locations have been selected as suitable centers for resistance. It was also noted that in support of State's efforts, CIA has conducted propaganda operations including a number of mass demonstrations in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

SOURCE:FILE:**TOP SECRET**STAFF:DATE:

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*ge* 13 Dec 93  
(1)(A)

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
Halpern      Gen Lansdale ✓ Bissell <del>Zorgbe</del>	Oct 1961	Castro

OCCURRENCE:

Shortly after ~~his~~ <sup>Halpern's</sup> meeting with Bissell, Halpern, and ~~Zorgbe~~ were introduced to Gen Lansdale who was the new Chief of Operations for an effort to remove ~~the~~ the Castro regime. The initial meeting was concerned with only organizational matters.

**TOP SECRET**

<u>SOURCE:</u>	Halpern 6/18/75	<u>STAFF:</u>	Wica
<u>FILE:</u>		<u>DATE:</u>	7/1/75

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<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
LANSDALE, /	Mar 2, 1962 Nov 30, 1961	Special Group <i>Mongoose</i>
<p><u>OCCURRENCE:</u> Lansdale traces the history of the project from its inception on Nov. 30, 1961 through March 1, 1962. Under the latter date, he notes, "The Chief of Operations /Lansdale/ is to report to the President through the Special Group (NSC 5412 Augmented by the Attorney General and the Chairman, JCS); the Special Group will be responsible for providing policy guidance for approving important operations, and for monitoring progress." (00181) Lansdale also submitted an intelligence plan for basic intelligence collection upon which to base the decision to undertake actions to cause the overthrow of Castro. The plan itself at pages 00183 through 00187, included establishing intelligence agents inside Cuba; collecting intelligence from Cubans inside the United States; counterfeiting ration cards and currency inside of Cuba; geographical surveys of air fields, military installations, communications centers; attempts to place trained agents inside the government organizations or to defect officials "in place"; and negotiating for British help in contaminating lubricants and fuels to cripple Cuban transportation. "The British want to know, how serious are you?", before risking their assets to help the U.S." (00180-00187)</p>		
<p><u>SOURCE:</u> Program review by Brig. Gen. Lansdale, Mar 2, 1962 on the Cuba Project (00180-00187)</p>	<p><u>STAFF:</u> di Genova <u>DATE:</u> June 30, 1975</p>	
<p><u>FILE:</u></p>		

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

LANSDALE, ✓

DATES:

1  
Mar 13, 1962

CATEGORIES:

Special Group Augmented  
MONGOOSE  
CUBA

Card 1 of 2

OCCURRENCE:

The planning for Operation MONGOOSE was prepared on a format of separate planning for each department and agency involved. Revised planning along that line was submitted with this memorandum. Activities already approved were marked with an asterisk. Approved were dispatching one intelligence agent operation to a key area selected by the CIA, ("Many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba will be trained for paramilitary skills as well as intelligence collection,...However, CIA has noted that, once the agents are inside Cuba, they cannot be controlled effectively from outside Cuba, although every effort will be made to attempt such control.") (00207), Caribbean Admissions Center Cpa-Locka, Florida. Periodic intelligence estimates, continued negotiating for British help in continuing locomotive lubricants, two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba approved for March 16-31, 1962, develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U.S., develop additional interrogation centers in other areas by 31 March 1962 in South America and

SOURCE:

Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented  
from Lansdale re: Institutional Planning, Operation MONGOOSE,  
13 March 1962 (00206-00213)

FILE:

STAFF  
di Genova  
DATE: July 1, 1975

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